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Abstract
Our model explains the observed gender-specic patterns of career and child care choices
through endogenous social norms. We study how these norms interact with the gender wage
gap. We show that via the social norm a couples child care and career choices impose an
externality on other couples, so that the laissez-faire is ine¢ cient. We use our model to
study the design and e¤ectiveness of three commonly used policies. We nd that child care
subsidies and women quotas can be e¤ective tools to mitigate or eliminate the externality.
Parental leave, however, may even intensify the externality and decrease welfare.
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1 Introduction
While the participation of women in the labor force has increased steadily over the last decades
(Goldin, 2006), gender inequalities in the labor market remain substantial. Signicant gender
di¤erences in wages, hours of work and occupational choices continue to exist in all OECD
countries, where women with a median wage earn on average 15% percent less than their male
counterpart. This di¤erential cannot be explained solely by gender di¤erences in schooling,
experience and job characteristics (e.g., ONeill, 2003; Fortin, 2005; Blau and Kahn, 2006).
Inequality is particularly striking when it comes to positions of leadership. In 2010, only one
out of ten seats (around 12%) in the boardrooms of Europes largest companies were held by a
woman. The percentage dramatically decreases when we consider leadership positions, such as
chairs and CEOs, where women hold only 3% of these roles.1
These career choices are mirrored by gender data on hours of work and child care provisions;
the share of couples where both parents work full-time is well below 50% in most European
countries.2 It is predominantly the mothers who work part-time, while at the same time, are
the main providers of child care within the family (e.g., National Time Use Survey; Paull, 2008;
Ciccia and Verloo, 2012).
Recent lines of research emphasize the role of social norms in shaping observed gender out-
comes (see Betrand (2011) for an overview). Fortin (2005) nds that agreement to the state-
ments: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women, and Being
a housewife is just as fullling as working for pay, are the most powerful explanatory factors
in explaining cross-country di¤erences in female employment rates and the gender wage gap.
Additionally, there is evidence that the presence of social norms, such as men being the main
breadwinners, may cause mothers who work full-time to feel guilty when they do not have the
time to take care of their children.3 Thus, social norms may provoke the di¤erential sorting of
men and women across occupations with women entering low pay occupations that allow for
more exible working hours (see, Albanesi and Olivetti, 2009; Goldin, 2014; Card, Cardoso and
Kline, 2016).
In this paper, we present a simple model which explains the observed di¤erent gender patterns
of career and child care decisions through (endogenously determined) social norms. Our model
reveals how these norms interact with and are reinforced by a (predetermined) gender wage gap.
We show that through social norms an individual couples child care and career decisions may
impose an externality on other couples so that the (female) labor market sorting observed in
the laissez-faire equilibrium may be ine¢ cient. Our model provides a theoretical underpinning
1See European Commissions report More women in senior positions, 2010.
2Exceptions are some Eastern European countries (Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria) and Portugal; see
the OECD Family Database.
3 In the psychological literature this is called mothers guilt. See, for instance, Guendouzi (2006).
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for the afore-mentioned empirical results on gender-specic labor market outcomes, and brings
together the various e¤ects which have been documented, showing how they interact and ex-
plaining the persistence of gender di¤erences in child care and career decisions. It also helps to
understand the current labor market sorting we observe in di¤erent countries (see Section 7).
At the same time, our model o¤ers a framework which provides guidance for gender-oriented
labor market and child care policies. In particular, we study the design and e¤ectiveness of three
commonly used policy instruments: child care subsidies, women quotas and parental leave.
Specically, we consider a population of parents who choose their career path, child care
arrangements and consumption. There are two career paths available; a full-time high-career
path, and a more exible low-career path. Individuals who take up the high-career path must
work the entire day and have no time to provide child care. The low-career path o¤ers exible
working hours and allows individuals to freely choose how much time to spend in the labor
market and on child care. The wage rate in the low-career path is the same for all spouses in each
couple. The high-career path, by contrast, comes with additional (future) earning possibilities
which di¤er across couples and gender. They are perfectly correlated within couples, but the
level that can be achieved by the mother is only a fraction of that available to the father, thus,
reecting the gender wage gap.
Couples are confronted with a social norm concerning child care activities. The norm derives
from the previous generations behavior. More precisely, it is determined by child care decisions
made by the median couple of the preceding generation. Deviations from the social norm may
impose a cost on the mother as well as on the father, but the determination of these costs is
gender specic. The mother may feel guilt about taking up the high-career path and buying
full-time child care on the private market if the majority of mothers in the previous generation
personally took care of their children. The father, by contrast, may su¤er from social stigma
when he chooses the low-career path and looks after the children if the majority of men in the
previous generation did not take care of their children.
With two career paths available to each spouse we have four scenarios to consider, but only
two are relevant in equilibrium. The rst is the traditional couple, where the mother chooses
the low-career path and provides some child care while the father opts for the high-career path.
The second is a couple where both parents take up the high-career path, work full-time and rely
entirely on market child care. We determine the couple who is indi¤erent between these two
scenarios and show that those with lower future high-career earning opportunities opt for the
traditional couple arrangement.
We concentrate on the steady state and characterize the laissez-faire solution when the
norm is binding, that is, when the median couple is traditional. The model is rich enough
to generate three types of rst-best solution according to whether or not the norm optimally
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binds and depending on whether or not it is optimal to force some couples into a specic
career path. First, we may have an unconstrained e¢ cient solution, in which case we e¤ectively
have two potential steady states; an unconstrained no-norm allocation would be the e¢ cient
solution (without externality) but the economy is stuckin the wrong steady state where the
norm binds (and where the share of traditional couples is too large). In the second case, the
norm is binding both in the e¢ cient solution and in laissez-faire equilibrium. The laissez-faire
equilibrium then involves that mothers in traditional couples spend too much time in child
care (because of the negative externality the norm imposes on high-career couples), and the
share of traditional couples is too large. Note that in the rst case, a one period transitional
policy may be su¢ cient to bring the economy to the e¢ cient steady state, while in the second
case, policies have to be permanent because of the externality. The constrained no-norm solution
represents the third type of possible rst-best solution. This di¤ers from the unconstrained case
in that a social planner forces some couples to become traditional even if their preference is for
undertaking the high-career path. Here, a transitory policy is no longer e¤ective, as we will
explain.
We show that a uniform child care subsidy nanced by a uniform lump-sum tax is welfare
improving in all cases. It can always be designed as a transitional policy in order to achieve the
e¢ cient (no-norm) steady state in the rst case. In the other cases, it cannot reestablish the
rst-best, but it is an e¢ ciency enhancing second-best policy.
Women quotas, are also e¤ective in achieving the e¢ cient no-norm steady state. In the
unconstrained case a transitory policy is su¢ cient, while the constrained solution calls for a
permanent policy. However, a women quota is ine¤ective in the case where the norm binds at
the e¢ cient solution. While women quotas can a¤ect the share of women in the high-career path,
they have no leverage on the level of child care provided by the traditional couple. Consequently,
they do not reduce the externality.
Finally, parental leave cannot eliminate the social norm when the norm is not binding in
the e¢ cient solution. With a binding norm it may or may not be welfare enhancing. It has
the benecial e¤ect of letting the high-career couples who opt for parental leave to freely choose
their child care. However, because it increases home child care it also exacerbates the externality
and thus the norm cost for high-career couples who opt out of parental leave.
2 Related Literature
First, our paper contributes to the growing literature on an individuals identity and social
norms. Akerlof and Kranton (2000; 2010) are the rst to formally analyze how gender identity
(that is, an individuals sense of self) can a¤ect various economic outcomes. They propose a
utility function in which identity is associated with di¤erent social categories. According to
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the theory, an individual may su¤er disutility by deviating from their categorys norms, which
causes behavior to conform toward those norms.
More recent papers, mostly empirical, try to nd explanations as to how social norms con-
cerning the division of labor in the household evolve over time. The key result of these papers is
that social norms of one generation are strongly a¤ected by the behavior of former generations.
Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) show that the variation in work behavior of
second-generation American women can be explained by the level of female labor force particip-
ation and attitudes towards womens work in their parents country of origin. Concentrating on
the family as a channel of norm transmission, Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) and Olivetti,
Patacchini and Zenou (2016) demonstrate that working mothers transmit di¤erent preferences
to their children than non-working mothers. Working mothers not only make it more attractive
for their daughters to invest in labor market skills, but also for the wives of their sons, since
these men more likely prefer a working wife themselves. Similarly, Farre and Vella (2013) show
that a mothers attitudes have a statistically signicant e¤ect on the attitudes of her children.
Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) argue that gender norms are very persistent and date back
even to pre-industrial agricultural societies.4
Our paper builds on the evidence provided by that literature and analyzes how, with an
endogenously evolving social norm, career choices and child care activities of one generation
a¤ect the behavior and welfare of future generations. In so doing, our paper complements studies
that emphasize the role of gender-(in)equality and analyze policies that improve womens labor
market outcomes. The most widely discussed policy in this respect are women quotas. Bertrand,
Black and Lleras-Muney (2014) and Matsa and Miller (2013) analyze the e¤ects on female labor
market outcomes in Norway after the implementation of a women quota in 2006. They show
that the gender-wage gap decreased for women with leadership positions on company boards.
Another policy that has received much attention, especially in the empirical literature, is that
of child care subsidies. Here, the evidence that child care subsidies increase the participation of
women in the labor force is indisputable; see, for instance, Averett, Peters and Waldman (1997);
Kimmel (1998); or Gelbach (2002). Our theoretical paper predicts that women quotas and
child care subsidies not only improve outcomes for women in the labor market, but at the same
time help to dissolve costly social norms. Finally, we analyze the e¤ectiveness of parental leave
(PL) programs. The empirical literature is as yet inconclusive on the overall e¤ect of parental
leave programs. Ruhm (1998), for instance, nds that PL increases the employment status of
women but at the cost of a reduction in their relative wages for extended periods. Lalive and
Zweimüller (2009) and Lalive et al. (2014) document the adverse short-run e¤ects of parental
4A theoretical model on optimal transmission of social norms within and outside the family is provided by
Bisin and Verdier (2000; 2001).
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leave on both employment and wages, but do not nd long-run e¤ects. We identify another,
formerly neglected, channel through which parental leave a¤ects womens welfare; although
parental leave increases the participation of women in the high-career path, it exacerbates the
negative externality generated by the social norm.
3 Economic environment
Consider a population of couples with children, the size of which is normalized to one. Each
couple consists of a mother m, a father f, and a given number of children. Couples choose
their career path, the mode of child care, and their consumption.
Labor market. There exist two types of career paths (indexed by j). First, a full engaging
high-career path, j = h, where individuals who take up this career path have to work an entire
day which we normalize to one. Second, a less demanding low-career path, j = `, o¤ering
exible working hours, where individuals can freely choose how much time to spend in the labor
market. The time not spent at work can be used for child care ci, where i = f;m. Both jobs
pay the wage rate y, but the high-career path comes with additional future earning possibilities
qi.5 We let qf 2 [0; q] and qm = qf 2 [0; q]; with  2 (0; 1]. An  < 1 simply reects unequal
opportunities for females and males as they are observed in nearly all developed countries.
Future revenue qf is distributed according to the density function f (:) ; with the cumulative
distribution being F (:). The median q is such that F (qM ) = 0:5. Future earning opportunities
are perfectly correlated in a couple. Consequently, there is a single level of qm associated with
each level of qf .6
Child care. Care for children provided by the spouse(s) is denoted by ci (i = f;m), while
that bought in the private market is denoted by cp. The latter costs p per unit of time. We let
p = y, meaning that the current salary of one member in the couple exactly covers the costs of
buying full-time child care on the private market.7 The children must be taken care of for the
entire day, implying cf + cm + cp = 1. Couples in which both parents choose the high-career
path thus have to fully rely on private child care. When parents enter a exible job their salary
5As a real world example, consider the low-career path as a job such that conciliating working-time and family
duties is relatively easy but comes at costs of no career opportunities as, for instance, a school or nursery teacher.
On the contrary, in the high-career path promotions are possible if the worker shows to be fully committed and
dedicated to the job (also in terms of time physically spent in the company); for instance, a manager can later
become chair or CEO of the company.
6Assortative mating is commonly observed and has been increasing over the last decades; see Schwartz and
Mare (2005).
7This assumption is simply a normalization that has no relevance for our results. Since p and y are the same for
all couples, without this assumption we would obtain a term proportional to (p  y) in the rst-order conditions
with respect to child care. This would a¤ect the equilibrium levels of child care but otherwise all other results
are not a¤ected.
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decreases proportionally to the time devoted to care. Informal and private care constitute a
family public good and its value to the parents is given by:
G (cf ; cm; cp) = v(cf + cm) + v(cp);
where v0 > 0; v00 < 0 and v(0) = 0. Care provided by the father and mother are thus perfect
substitutes while informal and private care are imperfect substitutes, with private care being
(weakly) less welfare-enhancing than informal care,  2 (0; 1].8 Apart from child care, each
parent derives utility from consumption of a numeraire commodity x.
Social norm. Couples are confronted with a social norm concerning child care activities. The
norm derives from the previous generations behavior. In particular, if in the previous generation
the median father took up the high-career path while the median mother chose the low-career
path and (partly) looked after the children, then those choices represent the social norm for the
current parents.
Deviations from the social norm may thus concern mothers as well as fathers, and are costly.
Mothers may feel guilt about taking up the high-career path and buying full-time child care on
the private market if the majority of mothers in the previous generation personally took care
of their children. Fathers, by contrast, may su¤er from social stigma when they choose the
low-career path and look after their children if the majority of fathers in the previous generation
did not take care of their children.
Formally, we represent the social norm for mothers belonging to generation t as costs of the
full-time job given by m(maxf0; cM;t 1m   ctmg), where cM;t 1m is time spent with children by
the median mother in the previous generation. For fathers, the social norm is the cost of the
exible job given by f (maxf0; ctf   cM;t 1f g), where cM;t 1f is time spent with children by the
median father in the previous generation. The parameter i 2 [0; 1] reects the costs of norm
deviations.
In this paper, we concentrate on the case where the median mother in the previous generation
entered the exible job market and took care of the children, while the median father took up
the high-career path.
Assumption 1 (Social norm active in period t) In period t 1 a majority of couples were
traditional, implying cM;t 1m > 0 and cM;t 1f = 0.
We will focus on decisions made at the steady state. Thus, we omit the subscript t for all
variables that di¤er from child care provided by the median mother and father in the previous
generation, so that cm  ctm and cf  ctf .
8See, for instance, Gregg et al. (2005), Bernal (2008), and Huerta et al. (2011).
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Timing. The timing of couplesdecisions is as follows: rst, parents choose their career path
and then, in the second stage, they choose consumption and the amount of child care (be it
formal or informal). Parents act cooperatively and maximize the sum of their utilities:
W = xm + xf +G(cf ; cm; cp)  m(maxf0; cM;t 1m   cmg)  f (maxf0; cf   cM;t 1f g):
Since individual consumption levels play no role in our model, we dene x  xm + xf for the
subsequent analysis.
4 Couples optimization
In this section, we rst analyze the choice of child care activities for each given career path
and then, by proceeding backward, we consider the choice of career path made by the couple.
Observe, however, that the two-stage approach of the couples decision making process is adopted
for the sake of presentation. Because no new information is revealed between the two stages and
nothing else changes, it yields the same outcome as a simultaneous choice.
4.1 Second Stage: Child care activities
At the second stage, we consider decisions made by four di¤erent types of couples: (i) only
the father enters the high-career path while the mother enters the exible job market; (ii) both
parents take up the high-career path; (iii) only the mother enters the high-career path, while the
father accepts the exible job; and (iv) both enter the exible job market. We will successively
study each of the four scenarios.
4.1.1 Only the father enters the high-career path
This scenario exactly replicates the social norm so that neither the father nor the mother su¤er
from a deviation to the norm, that is f (maxf0; 0 cM;t 1f g) = 0 and m(maxf0; cM;t 1m  cmg) =
0. Since the father took up the high-career path he is not able to take care of the children,
and cf = 0. Welfare of this couple is denoted by Wh`, where the rst subscript refers to the
fathers career choice and the second subscript refers to the mothers career choice. Noting that
cm + cp = 1 the couple chooses cm to maximize:
max
cm
Wh` = y + (1  cm) y + q   p(1  cm) + v(cm) + v(1  cm):
Given that p = y, the rst order condition with respect to cm can be written as:
ch`  cm : v0(ch`) = v0(1  ch`); (1)
where ch` is the total amount of child care provided by couple h`. From (1), marginal utility
from informal child care equals the marginal benet from private care.
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The traditional couples welfare is given by:
W h` = y + q + v(c

h`) + v(1  ch`); (2)
where its optimal consumption is given by xh` = y + q.
4.1.2 Both parents enter the high-career path
When both enter the high-career path their common earnings amount to 2y+qf+qm = 2y+q(1+
). Neither one of the couple is able to provide child care services so that cp = 1. The mother
su¤ers psychological costs equal to m(maxf0; cM;t 1m   0g) = mcM;t 1m , while the fathers costs
are given by f (maxf0; 0   cM;t 1f g) = 0. A high-career couple simply consumes its income.
Noting that p = y, their welfare can be written as:
W hh = y + q(1 + ) + v(1)  mcM;t 1m ; (3)
where the couples optimal consumption is given by xhh = y + q(1 + ).
4.1.3 Only the mother enters the high-career path
If the couple adopts the anti-normin that the mother chooses the full-time job while the father
enters the exible job market both parents (may) su¤er from norm deviations. The mothers
psychological costs amount to m(maxf0; cM;t 1m   0g) = mcM;t 1m , while the fathers costs are
given by f (maxf0; cf  cM;t 1f g) = fcf . Again, noting that p = y and cf +cp = 1, the couples
optimization problem can be written as:
max
cf
W`h = y + q + v(cf ) + v(1  cf )  mcM;t 1m   fcf : (4)
The rst order condition with respect to cf is given by:
c`h  cf : v0(c`h)  f = v0(1  c`h):
In words, the marginal utility from home child care net of the social stigma for the father equals
the marginal benet from private care. Inserting c`h back into (4) yields:
W `h = y + q + v(1  c`h)  mcM;t 1m   fc`h; (5)
where the couples optimal consumption is x`h = y + q.
4.1.4 Both parents enter the low-career path
If both parents choose the low-career path, the costs of the social norm are zero for the mother,
while they are f (maxf0; cf cM;t 1f g) = fcf for the father. Again, noting that cp = 1 cf cm
and p = y the couples optimization problem reads as:
max
cf ;cm
W`` = y + v(cm + cf ) + v(1  cm   cf )  fcf :
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The fathers and mothers optimal child care provisions are implicitly given by:
v0(cm + c

f )  v0(1  cm   cf )  f  0; (6)
v0(cm + c

f )  v0(1  cm   cf ) = 0: (7)
These rst order conditions show that if the father su¤ers from social stigma, i.e., f > 0, it is
optimal that only the mother takes care of the children, implying cf = 0 and c

``  cm > 0: If,
however, f = 0 then from the couples perspective it is of no importance who takes care of the
children, and all combinations of cm and cf such that
c``  cm + cf : v0(c``)  v0(1  c``) = 0; (8)
are optimal. The couples optimal consumption is x`` = y and welfare is given by:
W `` = y + v(c

``) + v(1  c``): (9)
Interestingly, the social stigma for the father is never relevant here because either f > 0 and
the father does not provide child care so that the social norm has no impact, or f = 0 and the
social stigma does not exist.
4.2 Comparing the di¤erent scenarios
The following lemma compares aggregate consumption levels and total child care provisions
across the four second stage scenarios.
Lemma 1 (Consumption and child care) In the laissez-faire,
(i) consumption levels of the four di¤erent types of couples satisfy: x`` < x

`h  xh` < xhh;
and
(ii) levels of child care chosen by the four di¤erent types of couples satisfy: 0 = chh < c

`h 
ch` = c

``:
In words, in traditional couples and in couples where the low-career path is chosen by both
parents, informal child care is relatively high, whereas in anti-normcouples the level of informal
child care is relatively low because of the social stigma f for the father. In general, high
consumption of the numeraire good is associated with the low provision of informal child care
and vice versa. This means that couples who exclusively rely on private child care are those
with the highest consumption, while those who partly take care of their children are those with
the lowest consumption levels.
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4.3 First Stage: Job market decision
At the rst stage, the couple compares its welfare levels and chooses its career path jj 2
fhh; h`; `h; ``g, such that couples welfare Wjj is maximized. Let us rst compare welfare levels
of traditional and anti-normcouples, that is:
W h` = y + q + v(c

h`) + v(1  ch`) Q
W `h = y + q + v(c

`h) + v(1  c`h)  mcM;t 1m   fc`h;
where cM;t 1m = ch`: Recall that c

`h  ch` so that the benet from child care is (weakly) higher
in traditional couples. The couple in which both partners act against the social norm has lower
welfare for three additional reasons. First, mothers in type-`h couples su¤er from deviations of
the social norm since they are not able to take care of their children. Second, fathers su¤er from
deviations of the social norm since they play an active role in child rearing. Finally, mothers in
the anti-normcouple will earn less than fathers in the traditional couple as long as the job
market su¤ers from unequal opportunities, which is why x`h  xh`. We thus have:
W h` W `h:
Unless there are equal opportunities  = 1 and no norm costs m = f = 0, a reversal of the
social norm can thus never be optimal in the rst stage.
Let us next compare the traditional coupleswelfare with the welfare of couples in which
both enter the low-career path, that is:
W h` = y + q + v(c

h`) + v(1  ch`) QW `` = y + v(c``) + v(1  c``):
Since x`` < x

h` and c

h` = c

``, we clearly have:
W h` > W

``:
To summarize results so far, when the father enters the low-career instead of the high-career
path, the couple forgoes the additional revenue q. For the father it is thus never optimal to
take up a exible job. Independent of his q he will always enter the high-career path. The
nal choice therefore concerns the mothers career and is a choice between being a high-career
couple or remaining with the social norm as a traditional couple. Formally, we must compare
the traditional couples welfare with the welfare of couples in which both parents enter the
high-career path:
W hh = y + q(1 + ) + v(1)  mcM;t 1m QW h` = y + q + v(ch`) + v(1  ch`):
As mentioned before, hh couples enjoy a larger utility from (future) consumption but a lower
utility from child care than h` couples. Whether or not they remain with the norm thus depends
on the mothersforegone labor market opportunities q.
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The marginal couple is the couple for which the father chooses the high-career path while the
mother is indi¤erent between the high- and low-career path, or the couple for which W hh =W

h`
holds. The marginal mothers identity denoted by q^ is thus in the interval [0; q] and
depends on the parameters ; ; and m. The following proposition summarizes the main
characteristics of the marginal couple q^ in the laissez-faire steady state equilibrium. Note that
the steady state equilibrium requires that the marginal couple lies to the right of the median
couple, i.e., qM < q^ because the social norm is binding by Assumption 1. This, in turn, implies
that the costs of the norm in equilibrium depend on child care provided by h`-couples, that is
cM;t 1m = ch`.
Proposition 1 (The marginal couple in the laissez-faire steady state) In the laissez-
faire, the marginal couple (that is, the couple where the mother is indi¤erent between the high-
and the low-career path) is dened by the following value of future job market opportunities q^:
q^ =
1

[v(ch`) +  [v(1  ch`)  v(1)] + mch`] ; (10)
where qM < q^ and ch` is determined by equation (1). The value of future job opportunities for
the marginal couple, q^:
(i) decreases in the degree of equal opportunities, ;
(ii) decreases in the gains of private care, ;
(iii) increases with the costs for the mother of deviating from the social norm m; and
(iv) increases with child care provided by the median mother, ch`.
In couples with q  q^, the mother chooses the high-career path, implying chh = 0 and cp = 1
and in couples with q < q^, the mother chooses the low-career path. Observe that here, and in
the remainder of the paper, we impose the tie-breaking rule that when a couple is indi¤erent
between the career paths the mother chooses the high-career one.9 The time spent with their
children for traditional couple is given by ch` and private market care amounts to c

p = 1  ch`.
Obviously, the larger q^, the higher the share of traditional couples and the lower the share
of female participation in the high-career path. Hence, Proposition 1 states that female parti-
cipation in the high-career path is negatively a¤ected by the gender wage gap, , and by child
care provided by the median mother in the previous generation, ch`. These two properties are
fundamental when we study welfare-improving policies in Section 6. In particular, we show that
with a women quota (which imposes a larger share of women in the high-career path) the policy-
maker is able to impact the marginal couple via . The other two policies (a subsidy on child
9This is a purely technical assumption which ensures that the optimization problems we consider below are
well-behaved (the no-norm solution will emerge for a closed interval of critical qs).
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care and parental leave) will instead be aimed at a¤ecting the amount of child care provided
by the median mother. Before proceeding with the policy analysis, we further characterize the
laissez-faire and describe the rst-best allocation(s) in our economy.
4.4 Characterization of the laissez-faire steady state
Job market outcome is given by the identity of the marginal couple and by the amount of child
care provided by traditional couples. The following proposition characterizes the laissez-faire
steady state.
Proposition 2 (Characterization of the laissez-faire) When the job market su¤ers from
unequal opportunities,  < 1, and/or a social norm a¤ecting those mothers who do not provide
child care exists, m > 0, then:
(i) it is never optimal for the father to take up the low-career path;
(ii) couples where the mother has job opportunities higher or equal to the threshold q^ choose
the high-career path for both parents;
(iii) the set of couples where both parents choose the high-career path is non-empty if q^  q;
and
(iv) in high-career couples chh = 0, whereas in traditional couples c

h` satises equation (1).
Given that q^ > qM (see Proposition 1), there will always be traditional couples in the
economy and q^ > 0. However, it is possible that the set of high-career couples is empty. In
the following section, we determine the e¢ cient share of female participation in the high-career
path.
5 First-best allocation and ine¢ ciency of laissez-faire
In this section, we characterize the rst-best solutions in order to describe the ine¢ ciencies
created by the social norm in the laissez-faire. Recall that not only the cost of the social norm
but also the norm itself is endogenous. It disappears if, in the previous generation, the majority
of mothers entered the high-career path. Hence, we analyze two types of benchmark cases; the
social norm is binding in the steady state; and where it is not binding.
We consider a utilitarian social welfare function which is given by the (unweighted) sum of
steady state utilities of all households. Recall that a job market allocation species the amount
of child care provided by traditional couples and the identity of the marginal couple, which, in
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turn, determines whether or not the social norm is binding in the steady state. Hence, we have
to derive ch` and q^ that maximizes the following social welfare function:
max
ch`;q^
SW =
Z q^
0
[y + q]f(q)dq + F (q^) [v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)]
+
Z q
q^
[y + q(1 + )]f(q)dq + (1  F (q^)) v(1)  mcMm  ; (11)
where cMm = ch` if q^ > q
M , that is, if the social norm is binding. If, instead q^  qM , the social
norm is not binding and cMm = 0. We denote the solution to the rst scenario as (c
n
h`; q^
n) and
that without an active norm as (coh`; q^
o).
Let us rst consider the case with a binding social norm. The solution to (11) is then
characterized by the following two rst order conditions:
v0(cnh`) = v
0(1  cnh`) + m
1  F (q^n)
F (q^n)
; (12)
q^n =
1

[v(cnh`) +  [v(1  cnh`)  v (1)] + mcnh`] : (13)
Since here the social norm is active in the steady state, we must have a higher share of traditional
couples in the population so that qM < q^n.
Comparing the laissez-faire (Equation 1) with the rst-best level of child care (Equation 12)
shows that the marginal costs of informal care provision (the RHS of Equations 1 and 12) are
higher in the rst-best than in the laissez-faire. This implies that traditional couples provide less
child care in the rst-best than in the laissez-faire: cnh` < c

h`. Intuitively, child care provided by
traditional couples imposes a negative externality, measured by the term m(1 F (q^n))=F (q^n),
on all high-career couples. In the laissez-faire, however, traditional couples do not take into
account that their informal care provision increases the costs of norm deviations by high-career
mothers.
This di¤erence in child care also has a bearing on the marginal couple. Equation (10)
coincides, for a given ch`, with the condition determining the marginal couple in the rst-best.
However, since:
ch` = argmaxfv(ch`) + v(1  ch`)g; (14)
and v is concave, we necessarily have that the RHS of (13) is smaller than the RHS of (10)
implying q^n < q^.
When, on the other hand, the social norm is not active in the rst-best steady state, then
the solution to (11) is characterized by the following two rst order conditions:
v0(coh`) =v
0(1  coh`); (15)
q^o =
1

[v(coh`) +  [v(1  coh`)  v (1)]] : (16)
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Since here the social norm is non-binding, we must have q^o  qM implying F (q^o)  F (qM ) so
that a majority of couples indeed take up the high-career path.
Comparing (coh`; q^
o) with the laissez-faire, we see that without an active social norm in rst-
best, the marginal costs (and benets) of informal child care coincide with those in laissez-faire
(Equation 1). We thus have cnh` < c
o
h` = c

h`. This, however, does not imply that the marginal
couples also coincide. Since in laissez-faire the norm is active, couples take, when choosing their
career path, the costs of deviations from the norm into account. In rst-best these costs are,
however, not present so that the RHS of (16) is smaller than the RHS of (10), implying q^o < q^.
The two scenarios, (cnh`; q^
n) and (coh`; q^
o) describe interior solutions in the sense that @SW=@ch` =
@SW=@q^ = 0 for a given level of cMm . Specically, we have c
M
m = c
n
h` in the binding norm case
and cMm = 0 in the non-binding norm case. This implies that couple q^
n is e¤ectively indi¤erent
between the two career paths when cMm = c
n
h`, while couple q^
o is indi¤erent for cMm = 0.
However, we cannot rule out the case where the distribution of qs is such that qM < q^o at coh`
and cMm = 0. In other words, maximizing (11) with respect to q^ for c
M
m = 0 may yield a solution
which is larger than qM . This, in turn, is inconsistent with cMm = 0. To have consistency, we then
have to consider a constrained solution where we impose q^ = qM .10 This amounts to assigning
all couples with q 2 [qM ; q^o) to the high-career path so that the norm is indeed not binding in
steady state.11 Such a scenario is optimal when it yields a higher welfare than that achieved
with a binding norm, that is with (cnh`; q^
n). Observe that if q^o is only slightly larger than qM
forcing some couples to take the high-career path and thereby removing the social norm and
its costs might dominate an equilibrium with a binding norm.12 It can be easily veried that
such a solution does not a¤ect the optimal level of ch` which is given by coh` in the constrained
no-norm solution as in the unconstrained no-norm solution.13
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (The e¢ cient steady state allocation) Depending on the parameters of the
10Formally, this can be achieved by stating the optimization for cMm = 0 as a Kuhn-Tucker problem imposing
the constraint that qM  q^ associated with a multiplier   0, so that the FOC of the Kuhn-Tucker expression
with respect to q^ is given by @SW=@q^ = . This yields the unconstrained solution with q^ = q^o when  = 0, while
the constrained solution with q^ = qM (and @SW=@q^ > 0) obtains when  > 0.
11Recall that couple q^o is by denition indi¤erent between the two career paths (given cMm = 0). Consequently,
couples with q 2 [qM ; q^o) would prefer the low-career path if they were free to choose. However, in a rst-best
world they can be assigned to a di¤erent path.
12The counterpart to this case with a constrained binding norm is when the maximization of (11) yields qM > q^n
for cMm = c
n
h` > 0 which is not possible. It would require setting q^ > q
M , forcing some couples into their less-
preferred career path in order to create a binding norm and thus a negative externality. This solution is clearly
not optimal; it is necessarily dominated by the constrained no-norm allocation.
13Returning to the Kuhn-Tucker formulation presented in footnote 10, it is clear that the FOC of the Kuhn-
Tucker expression with respect to ch` does not depend on .
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utility function and on the distribution of q, the e¢ cient steady state allocation (ch`; q^) is given
by one of the following solutions of the social welfare program expressed in (11):
(i) the unconstrained no-norm rst-best, (coh`; q^
o), dened by Equations (15) and (16) with
q^o < qM ; or
(ii) the constrained no-norm rst-best, (coh`; q
M ); dened by Equation (15) and with q^o = qM ;
or
(iii) the binding norm rst-best, (cnh`; q^
n), dened by Equations (12) and (13) with qM < q^n.
Comparing the laissez-faire steady state described in Proposition 1 with the e¢ cient alloc-
ations described in Proposition 3, yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Welfare analysis of the laissez-faire with a binding norm) Comparing
the laissez-faire equilibrium with the rst-best allocations described in Proposition 3:
(i) when the norm is binding in rst-best, informal child care in laissez-faire, ch`, is ine¢ -
ciently high because of the negative externality it exerts on high-career mothers through
the social norm. When instead the social norm is not binding in rst-best (in both the
constrained and unconstrained case), then neglecting the externality is e¢ cient and the
amount of informal child care is e¢ ciently chosen in laissez-faire; and
(ii) female participation in the high-career path is always ine¢ ciently low in laissez-faire.
Let us rst consider point (i) in the previous Proposition concerning child care provision.
The fact that the negative externality is always ignored in laissez-faire translates into excessive
informal child care provision by traditional couples in laissez-faire (cnh` < c

h`) when the norm
is also binding in rst-best. When, instead, the norm is not binding in rst-best informal child
care is e¢ cient (coh` = c

h`) because in this case no negative externality exists. This is true both
for the unconstrained and the constrained case.
We now consider point (ii) in Proposition 4 concerning the share of women entering the high-
career path. In laissez-faire female participation in the high-career path is always ine¢ ciently
low, both when the social norm is binding in rst-best
 
qM < q^n

and when it is not
 
q^o  qM.
In either case, the ine¢ ciency is caused by the social norm, but the mechanism through which
it is a¤ecting the laissez-faire di¤ers across the two scenarios. When the norm is not binding
in rst-best, then the social norm is taken into account by high-career mothers in laissez-faire,
while it is absent in rst-best and, as a consequence, q^o < q^. When, instead, the social norm is
binding in rst-best, then informal child care provision by traditional mothers in laissez-faire is
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too high because they ignore the negative externality. As a consequence, the high-career path
becomes less attractive, implying q^n < q^.
The following lemma established in Appendix A.1 describes how the various parameters of
our model a¤ect the e¢ cient solution. In particular, our comparative statics illustrate when the
(unconstrained or constrained) rst-best with a non-binding social norm is likely to ensure the
highest social welfare.
Lemma 2 (No-norm vs binding norm in the steady state) Ceteris paribus, a no-norm
steady state is more likely to prevail than a binding norm steady state the larger (i) qM , (ii) ,
(iii) , or (iv) m is.
When ceteris paribus qM is large, then q^o  qM will hold for a larger set of the other paramet-
ers (namely  and ) so that the non-binding norm solution becomes more likely. Additionally,
the binding norm solution becomes more costly, and thus the no-norm solution becomes more
appealing, when more mothers tend to choose the high-career path. This is also the case when
 or  are large (see Proposition 1). Finally, social welfare decreases with a binding norm when
the costs of the norm m increase, which explains point (iv) in the above proposition.
Our model thus suggests that in economies with a low gender wage gap ( is large), a high
cost of the norm (m is large) and a high-quality child care system ( is large), the prevailing
rst-best tends to be a no-norm steady state; all these factors concur to increase social welfare
when the norm disappears. The same factors result in more career women in laissez-faire. On
the contrary, in economies where the gender wage gap is pronounced ( is small) and formal
child care is relatively less structured ( is small), the social norm is not particularly costly and
the rst-best is more likely to imply a binding norm. At the same time, the share of career
mothers in such an environment will be relatively low in laissez-faire.
The next section shows that the nature of the rst-best a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of the con-
sidered child care and gender policies in a rather striking way. Generally speaking, the nature
of the rst-best determines the design of second-best policies. Consequently, Lemma 2 and the
subsequent discussion are important in order to assess the practical policy implications of our
model. In the Conclusion, we illustrate these predictions by showing how existing empirical
results and stylized facts can be used to determine which type of rst-best can be expected to
be relevant in specic countries or types of countries.
So far, we have imposed Assumption 1 and have studied the ine¢ ciencies characterizing the
laissez-faire when the social norm is binding in period t. For the sake of completeness, suppose
instead that the social norm is not binding in t, then:
Lemma 3 (Welfare analysis of laissez-faire when the norm is not binding) If the norm
is not binding in the laissez-faire steady state (that is, Assumption 1 does not hold), then coh` = c

h`
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and q^ = q^o, so that the laissez-faire coincides with the rst-best steady state.
6 Welfare improving policies
We now analyze how the government can improve e¢ ciency by focusing on policy design. Spe-
cically, we study the e¤ects on motherscareer choices and child care provision of three policies
currently used in the real world, namely, (i) uniform child care subsidies, (ii) women quotas
and (iii) parental leave.
In analyzing these policies, we must di¤erentiate between policy implementation when the
target is the rst-best without an active social norm, and when the policy target is instead the
rst-best allocation with a binding norm. When the social norm is not binding in rst-best, the
appropriate policy may be transitory. In this instance, the policy has to decrease the marginal
couple q^ to the point where q^ = qM for a single period. Once this objective is reached, the
policy no longer has reason to be implemented because Lemma 3 holds in the subsequent period;
the social norm disappears and e¢ ciency is restored, that is, q^ = q^o and ch` = c
o
h`. In this
case, we derive welfare of the transition generation. When, on the other hand, the social norm
is binding in rst-best the policy must be implemented permanently, and we concentrate on
welfare in the new steady state.
6.1 Uniform subsidy on formal child care
We rst consider a uniform subsidy s on market child care reducing its price to p  s.14 Assume
that the subsidy is nanced by a uniform lump-sum tax T levied on all couples. The consumption
level for high-career couples is then given by xUhh = y + q(1 + ) + s   T , while it is xUh` =
y + q + s(1  cUh`)  T for low-career couples. With a subsidy on private care optimal informal
child care, denoted by cUh`, by type-h` couples is implicitly determined by:
v0(cUh`) = v
0(1  cUh`) + s: (17)
A subsidy on market care increases the marginal costs of informal care (RHS of Equation 17)
and informal care will be lower than in laissez-faire: cUh` < c

h`.
6.1.1 Social norm is non-binding in the e¢ cient steady state
Consider rst the unconstrained case. As mentioned before, in order to implement the rst-best
steady state the social planner must determine s which makes qM the marginal couple. Hence,
s solves:
qM =
1

h
v(cUh`) + 

v(1  cUh`)  v (1)

+ mc
M;t 1
h`   scUh`
i
: (18)
14The case where s = p can be interpreted as free (possibly public) provision of child care.
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Budget balance requires:
T = s

1  F (qM )cUh`

: (19)
Condition (18) ensures that given the costs of the social norm mc
M;t 1
h` = mc

h`, the marginal
couple goes down to qM . Consequently, in the next period cM;tm = 0, and we are in the rst-best
steady state described in Lemma 3, thus no further intervention is necessary.
Note, however, that child care provision cUh` chosen in the transitory period is ine¢ ciently
low; with a non-binding norm in rst-best, the laissez-faire level of informal child care (that is
without a subsidy) is e¢ cient because the negative externality is optimally ignored in that case.
It can be easily checked that welfare within the transition period is given by:
SWU = Ehh[q] + E[q] + y + F (q
M )[v(1) + v(cUh`) + v(1  cUh`)  mch`]; (20)
where we have substituted E[q] and Ehh [q] respectively dened as:15
E[q] 
Z q
0
qf(q)dq and Ehh[q] 
Z q
qM
qf(q)dq:
When the optimal solution is given by the constrained no-norm solution, the policy described
continues to ensure q^ = qM so that the norm disappears. But in this case, the policy needs to
be implemented on a permanent basis. Consequently, with uniform subsidies, the constrained
rst-best cannot be achieved, as child care will remain at an ine¢ ciently low level in the new
steady state. In other words, removing the social norm now involves a permanent cost. As an
alternative we must consider the policy applied in the binding norm case studied in the next
subsection, which consists of mitigating the norm rather than eliminating it. Of course, this
policy does not implement the rst-best best either, but when the costs of eradicating the norm
are su¢ ciently large, it may be the best policy. The second-best optimum is determined by
comparing the levels of welfare achieved in each of the alternative policies.
6.1.2 Social norm is binding in the e¢ cient steady state
At the steady state with a binding social norm, the social planner anticipates that cMm = c
M
h` =
cUh`. Thus, the social planner maximizes the following welfare function:
max
s;T
SWU =
Z q^U
0
[y + q + s(1  cUh`)  T ]f(q)dq + F (q^U )[v(cUh`) + v(1  cUh`)]
+
Z q
q^U
[y + q(1 + ) + s  T ]f(q)dq +  1  F (q^U ) v(1)  mcUh` ; (21)
15We show in Appendix A.2 that a uniform subsidy on full-time care only can achieve the same steady state
but yields a higher level of transition utility.
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subject to the same budget constraint as given in (19). Optimal child care continues to be given
by (17) and q^U is dened by:
q^U =
1


v(cUh`) + 

v(1  cUh`)  v (1)

+ (m   s) cUh`

: (22)
Substituting (19) into the welfare function, the rst-order condition of (21) with respect to s
can be written as:
s(q^U ) = m
1  F (q^U )
F (q^U ) + f(q^U )cUh`
@q^U=@s
@cUh`=@s
: (23)
Since @q^U=@s =  cUh`= < 0 and @cUh`=@s < 0 Equation (23) implies:
s(q^U ) < sP (q^U )  m
1  F (q^U )
F (q^U )
: (24)
In words, the optimal s is smaller than the Pigouvian subsidy sP that restores e¢ ciency of
informal child care for a given level of q^U . The Pigouvian tax rule, sP (q^), is obtained by
equating (12) and (17), and it depends on q^ since the costs of the externality depend on the
number of high-career couples. From (24) we see that, given q^U , the subsidy on market care
is set at a lower level than the Pigouvian subsidy. This is because a uniform subsidy benets
high-career couples more than traditional ones. For high-career couples, market care is given
and equal to one so that the subsidy represents a windfall gain. Consequently, the policy will
distort q^ downwards which was otherwise optimally chosen in laissez-faire for any given level of
the traditional coupleschild care. Observe that this comparison is based on tax rules (that is,
given qU ), the rst- and second-best levels of the subsidy, s(q^U ) and sP (q^n), cannot be compared
since q^U and q^n di¤er.
Proposition 5 (Uniform subsidy on formal child care) Consider a uniform subsidy on
child care nanced by a uniform lump-sum tax:
(i) when the e¢ cient steady state is given by the unconstrained no-norm solution, it can be
achieved by a uniform subsidy which is implemented for one period only and is set to
make the marginal couple coincide with the median one. In the transition period in which
the subsidy is imposed, informal child care is ine¢ ciently low. In the subsequent periods,
e¢ ciency is fully restored;
(ii) when the social norm is binding in the e¢ cient steady state, the uniform subsidy is imple-
mented indenitely. It mitigates the norm costs by reducing the median couples informal
child care provision. E¢ ciency is only partially restored: informal child care is lower than
in the laissez-faire but (given q^U ) it is larger than e¢ cient; and
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(iii) when the e¢ cient steady state is given by the constrained no-norm solution, the optimal
policy is either the one described in (i) but implemented on a permanent basis, or the one
explained in (ii), whichever of these gives the highest level of welfare.
6.2 Women quotas
A women quota (WQ) requires that the number of women in the high-career path, 1   F (q^),
in the total number of high-career employees, 1 + 1  F (q^), is not lower than r, that is:
r  1  F (q^
)
2  F (q^) : (25)
We argue that employers who are confronted with a WQ reduce the gender wage gap to make it
more attractive for women to enter the high-career path. Specically, they increase the premium
to their female high-career employees by sm nanced by a reduction in the salary of their high-
career males by tf so that their prots remain unchanged.16 Hence, implementing a WQ in
practice translates into imposing rms to reduce the gender wage gap.
6.2.1 Social norm is non-binding in the e¢ cient steady state
Again, we start with the case where the unconstrained solution is such that the social norm is
not binding in the rst-best steady state. In that case, a transitory policy (implemented during
a single period) is su¢ cient and it must be designed to make qM the marginal couple. That way
the norm disappears in subsequent periods and Lemma 3 applies.
Evaluating expression (25) at q^ = qM shows that this requires a WQ of r = 1=3 = (1  
1=2)=(2   1=2). In words, at least 1/3 of workers in the high-career path must be women. To
achieve this, sm and tf have to be chosen so that the median couple is indi¤erent between the
high- and low-career for the female spouse, that is:
y + qM [1  tf + (1 + sm)] + v(1)  mcM;t 1h` =
y + qM [1  tf ] + v(ch`) + v(1  ch`); (26)
where cM;t 1h` = c

h` and c

h` is implicitly determined by Equation (1). Prot neutrality for the
rms require:
tfE[q] = smEhh[q] ) sm = E[q]Ehh[q] tf  Atf ; (27)
16This modeling strategy of WQ appears the most coherent with our setting where rms have no active role, and
it is also justied by the literature mentioned in Section 2. In particular, Matsa and Miller (2013) and Bertrand
et al. (2014) show that, after the implementation of a WQ in Norway, the gender-wage gap decreased for those
women on boards.
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where A Q 1, depending on the distribution of q.17 Observe that this policy reduces the gender
wage gap, and when sm and tf are su¢ ciently large it could even be reversed with qf = q(1 tf ) <
qm = q(1+sm). The policy remains e¤ective even in that case as long as it does not reverse the
ranking of career choices within couples, that is, when the norm cost for fathers is su¢ ciently
large to prevent them from choosing the low-career path.
Welfare within the transition period when WQs are in place is given by:
SWQ =Ehh[q] + E[q] + y + F (q
M )[v(1) + v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)  mch`]: (28)
By comparing (20) and (28) we observe that SWQ > SWU . Unlike the uniform subsidy, which
distorts ch`, the WQ policy achieves q^ = qM together with an e¢ cient child care provision, that
is ch` = c
o
h`. Consequently, welfare in the transition generation is larger under a WQ than with
a uniform subsidy on market child care. Since both policies yield the same steady state (the
e¢ cient rst-best equilibrium) this pleads in favor of a WQ.
When the rst-best is given by the constrained no-norm solution, the policy just described
remains e¤ective, but it must now be permanent; if it were abandoned, the economy would
return to a steady state with a binding norm. In this case the WQ dominates the uniform
subsidy policy not just in the transition period but also in steady state.
6.2.2 Social norm is binding in the e¢ cient steady state
If the social norm is binding in the e¢ cient steady state, then cMm = c
M
h` = c

h` and the government
chooses the WQ (or the transfers tf and sm necessary to reduce the gender wage gap) so as to
maximize the following welfare function:
max
tf ;sm;q^Q
SWQ =
Z q^Q
0
[y + q[1  tf ] + v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)]f(q)dq
+
Z q
q^Q
[y + q[1  tf + (1 + sm)] + v(1)  mcm]f(q)dq; (29)
subject to the prot neutrality constraint given in (27). Optimal informal child care continues
to be given by Equation (1) while the marginal couple q^Q is implicitly determined by (26) with
q^Q instead of qM , that is
q^Q =
1
(1 + sm)
[v(ch`) +  [v(1  ch`)  v(1)] + mch`] : (30)
17With a uniform distribution, for instance, we have E [q] = qM = q=2 so that:
Ehh[q] =
1
q

q2
2
  (q
M )2
2

=
q   qM
q
(q + qM )
2
=
(q + qM )
4
=
2qM + qM
4
=
3
4
qM ;
implying A = 4=3.
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Observe that (30) denes q^Q as a decreasing function of sm. As sm increases, the e¤ective level
of  increases and, the participation of women in the high-career path rises; see also Proposition
1 (i). However, recall that when the social norm is binding in the e¢ cient steady state, the
marginal couple was (for any given level of informal child care) optimally chosen in laissez-faire.
Hence, the policy is not e¤ective in improving e¢ ciency.
To see this formally, di¤erentiate the Lagrangian expression of the above optimization prob-
lem, denoted by LQ, with respect to tf :
@LQ
@tf
=  E[q] + E[q] = 0:
Thus,  (the Lagrange multiplier of Equation (27)) is equal to one. Because all fathers are in a
high-career path, tf is e¤ectively a lump sum tax. Consequently, the marginal social benet is
equal to the marginal social cost; there is no deadweight loss.
The derivative of LQ with respect to sm is given by:
@LQ
@sm
= Ehh[q]  Ehh[q] + smq^Qf(q^Q)@q^
Q
@sm
 0: (31)
Since  = 1 and @q^Q=@sm < 0, the above equation is negative for sm > 0. Consequently, the
optimal policy implies sm = 0, and with (27), also tf = 0. In other words, no WQ should be
imposed. This result may seem surprising, given that setting a WQ translates into imposing a
reduction of the gender wage gap. Intuitively, the policy is not welfare improving because sm
is not a lump-sum subsidy. Equation (31) simply rediscovers a classical result in tax theory,
namely, that a distortionary subsidy nanced by a lump-sum tax reduces welfare. The third
term on the RHS is e¤ectively the deadweight loss of the subsidy. It arises because an increase in
sm reduces q^Q (which was otherwise, without the WQ, e¢ cient) and thus increases the number
of high-career couples who benet from the subsidy. This argument shows that a WQ is costly,
though it could still be desirable if it also had benets. Surprisingly, when the norm is binding
in steady state, the WQ has no benets. In order to be benecial, it would have to reduce
the costs of the norm by decreasing traditional couplesinformal child care provision. This was
achieved by the uniform subsidy in the previous subsection, but the WQ (or tf and sm) has
no impact on ch`. The WQ a¤ects the marginal couple but this couples is already e¢ cient in
laissez-faire (for a given ch`).
Proposition 6 (A women quota) Consider a WQ requiring a minimum share of women in
the high-career path and being implemented by a premium sm to female high-career employees,
that is nanced by a reduction tf in the salary of high-career males so that prots are unchanged,
then:
(i) when the social norm is non-binding in the e¢ cient steady state, a WQ set to make the
marginal couple coincide with the median one implements the e¢ cient solution. In the
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unconstrained case a transitional (one period) policy is su¢ cient, while in the constrained
case the policy must be permanent. In both situations the e¢ cient steady state is attained
after a single transition period. Informal child care by traditional couples is not a¤ected
by the policy. Consequently, a WQ policy dominates the uniform subsidy. In the uncon-
strained case it yields a larger welfare in the transition period but the same in steady state.
In the constrained case it also yields a larger steady state welfare; and
(ii) when the social norm is binding in the e¢ cient steady state, the policy is ine¤ective and
reduces welfare.
6.3 Parental leave
Parental leave (PL) entitles a parent (mother or father) to receive the salary y during a given
period while taking a break from work to care for the (newborn) child. In the case of high-career
workers, PL implies that they obtain the same exibility as low-career workers and are free to
decide how to split their time between working and child care activities. However, PL comes
at a cost in terms of future earning opportunities. Being on leave for one period implies lower
opportunities for future promotions; an employer may perceive a workers request for leave as
a signal of a lower level of commitment to the job, or a worker may miss the opportunity to
increase their professional knowledge by not taking part in projects relevant to the rm. We
denote qk (or qk for career mothers) with k 2 (0; 1) the share of future earning opportunities
that are maintained by workers in the high-career path when they request PL. We assume that
PL is nanced by a lump sum tax T imposed on all couples.
Di¤ering from the policies already presented, PL is an option, and thus couples must decide
whether or not to benet from it and which parent will opt in to PL. So, in analyzing welfare
implications of PL we must return to the second stage of a couplea decision and verify under
which conditions they are willing to take PL. For the sake of presentation, we consider the
following timing of choices: rst, parents make their career choice; then, they decide about
opting in or out of PL; and nally, they choose the amount of informal child care provision.
When the hh couple opts in to PL, they choose child care to maximize:
max
cm
WLhh = 2y+ q(1 +k)  T   p(1  cm) + v(cm) + v(1  cm)  m(maxf0; cM;t 1m   cmg):
Note that PL does not a¤ect the ranking of incomes within a couple. Consequently, it will still
be the mother (if any parent) who will opt in PL. Recalling that p = y, the FOC with respect
to cm is given by:
cLhh  cLm : y + v0(cLhh)  v0(1  cLhh) = 0: (32)
With PL hh couples are able to enjoy the larger benet of informal child care. Since informal
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care does not imply any opportunity costs in terms of lower salary y, we have cLhh > c
M;t 1
m = ch`,
so that the costs of deviating from the social norm will disappear.
A type-hh couple will opt in PL if it is welfare improving to do so, that is if:
2y+ q(1+k) T   p(1  cLhh)+ v(cLhh)+v(1  cLhh) > y+ q(1+) T +v(1)  mch`; (33)
where the RHS denotes welfare of hh couples when opting out of PL. So, there exists a critical
value of future job market opportunities dened by
~qL =
1
(1  k)

ycLhh + v(c
L
hh) + [v(1  cLhh)  v(1)] + mch`

(34)
below which the hh couple accepts PL. Couples with q  ~qL will instead opt out of PL. For
them the opportunity costs of PL given by (1  k)q are too high.
We now consider type-h` couples. If they take PL, their optimal child care maximizes:
max
cm
WLh` = 2y + q   T   p(1  cm) + v(cm) + v(1  cm):
The FOC is again given by Equation (32) so that cLh` = c
L
hh > c

h`. Notice that traditional
couples will always opt for PL; for them the PL option comes at no cost, rather the contrary
is true. As the mother continues to receive her whole salary, informal care provision does not
imply any opportunity cost in terms of lower y (see Appendix A.3 for a formal proof).
Next, we analyze the career choice of each couple. We must consider two scenarios. First, hh
couples opt in to PL and, second they opt out of PL. First, consider an hh couple with q < ~qL
(that is, a couple who opts in to PL if they took up the high-career path). Such a couple initially
enters the high-career path if WLhh > W
L
h`. Recalling that c
L
h` = c
L
hh this inequality is always true
so that all couples with q < ~qL will enter the high-career path and take up PL. Let us conrm
that all couples with q  ~qL will enter the high-career path but will not accept PL. For this to
be true, it must be that:
y + q(1 + )  T + v(1)  mch`  2y + q   T   p(1  cLh`) + v(cLh`) + v(1  cLh`); (35)
where the LHS is welfare of hh couples opting out of PL, and the RHS is welfare of h` couples
opting in PL. Notice that if (35) holds for q = ~qL, then it necessarily holds for all q > ~qL.
Substituting ~qL dened by (34) for q, inequality (35) reduces to:
mc

h`  v(1)  [ycLh` + v(cLh`) + v(1  cLh`)];
which always holds since the RHS is negative while the LHS is positive. The following lemma
summarizes these results and shows that ~qL is always larger than the median level qM .
Lemma 4 (Parental leave) When PL is an option:
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(i) all couples decide to enter the high-career path;
(ii) couples with q < ~qL will opt in PL while couples with q  ~qL will opt out from PL, where
~qL is dened in (34); and
(iii) the share of couples where both parents work full time is lower than in laissez-faire: qM <
q^ < ~qL.
Parts (i) and (ii) directly result from the previous discussion. The proof of part (iii) can
be found in Appendix A.3. Note that the PL policy also makes the high-career path valuable
to women with low future labor market opportunities, so that full female participation in the
high-career path is obtained.
We are now in a position to study the e¤ectiveness of the PL policy. Strictly speaking, the
rst-best allocations described in Section 5 are not the appropriate benchmark here. PL allows
couples in the high-career path to be exible and to provide some child care whereas this option
does not exist in our e¢ cient steady states. While keeping this in mind, for the sake of symmetry
between sections, we will nevertheless continue to refer to the earlier benchmarks in order to
present our results.18
From Lemma 4 (ii) we know that ~qL > q^ > qM . Consequently, the policy cannot be used
to achieve a steady state with cMm = 0, where the norm is not binding. In other words, PL is
not e¤ective as a transitory policy to achieve a steady state where the norm is not binding, nor
as a permanent policy to eliminate the norm in the constrained case. Since ~qL > qM , the norm
spills over to the next period and deviations from the norm become even more costly since the
PL induces a higher informal child care provision.
To asses the e¤ectiveness of PL as a second-best policy, we compare the outcome produced
by the PL in steady state with the laissez-faire. Here we observe a benet and a cost of the
policy. The former is the benet from future earning opportunities k
R q^
0 qf(q)dq accruing to
couples who, under laissez-faire, were choosing the low-career path. The costs are the additional
costs of the social norm. Indeed, one period after the policy is implemented, the median couple
is choosing the amount of care cLhh > c

h` and thus couples opting out of PL (that is, couples
with q 2 ~qL; q), are paying the additional costs of the social norm m 1  F  ~qL (cLhh   ch`).
Consequently, PL is welfare improving if the benet from future earning opportunities accruing
to new couples entering the high-career path (those with q < q^) more than compensates for the
additional costs of the social norm a¤ecting hh couples opting out of PL. Formally, if:
k
Z q^
0
qf(q)dq   m

1  F  ~qL (cLhh   ch`) > 0: (36)
18 In other words, we continue to use the term e¢ cient steady state for the solution presented in Section 5.
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Proposition 7 (Parental leave) Consider a PL nanced by a lump sum tax T imposed on all
couples which entitles one of the parents to receive the salary y while taking care of the children.
With PL, high-career workers are free to provide child care, but they lose the fraction k of their
future job opportunities. With such a policy, all couples enter the high-career path, however,
informal child care is ine¢ ciently high. Moreover:
(i) the policy cannot be used to achieve a steady-state with a non-binding norm; and
(ii) the policy is welfare improving if condition (36) is satised. In words, the benets from
future earning opportunities accruing to new couples entering the high-career path must
outweigh the additional costs of the social norm a¤ecting couples who do not take PL.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a simple model to explain observed gender patterns of labor market and
child care decisions through (endogenously determined) social norms. It reveals how these norms
interact with and are reinforced by an exogenous gender wage gap. Couples cooperatively decide
on both of the spousescareer paths and on child care arrangements. The low-career path o¤ers
the exibility to provide child care, while the high-career path requires full-time commitment
but also generates additional (future) earning possibilities. The latter di¤ers across couples.
Career and child care choices are a¤ected by a social norm which is determined by the
median couples child care decisions of the preceding generation. In equilibrium, two types of
couples prevail: rst, the traditional couple, where the mother chooses the low-career path
and provides some child care while the father opts for the high-career path; second, the couple
where both parents take up the high-career path, work full-time and must rely entirely on market
child care.
We have concentrated on the steady state and have characterized the laissez-faire solution
when the norm is binding, that is, when the median couple is traditional. Compared to the
rst-best, the share of traditional couples is always too large. When the norm is binding in the
rst-best, the informal child care provision of traditional couples imposes a negative externality
(via the norm cost) on high-career couples, and thus it will be too extensive. When, on the
other hand, the e¢ cient steady state involves a non-binding norm, informal child care coincides
with its rst-best level.
The e¤ectiveness of the considered second-best policy depends on the nature of the rst-best
steady state. A linear subsidy on market child care is always welfare-improving, albeit to a
di¤ering degree depending on the e¢ cient steady state. When this is of the unconstrained no-
norm type, a transitional (one period) policy implements the e¢ cient steady state, otherwise,
we have a second-best solution since the externality will only partly be mitigated.
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Women quotas are e¤ective in achieving a rst-best no-norm steady state. In the uncon-
strained case, a transitional policy is su¢ cient, while it must be permanent in the constrained
case. In these situations, a WQ welfare dominates child care subsidies since it does not distort
child care provision. When, however, the e¢ cient steady state implies a binding norm, then
the policy is ine¤ective; it has no impact on the traditional coupleschild care and thus cannot
mitigate the externality.
A parental leave policy can never bring about a no-norm steady state. However, it can be
second-best e¢ cient when the benet from future earning opportunities accruing to new couples
entering the high-career path outweigh the additional costs of the social norm a¤ecting the
couples who do not take up PL.
Our model shows that a given policy is likely to have a di¤erent impact, according to the type
of rst-best steady state (with or without a binding norm), that is relevant in the considered
country. This, in turn, depends on the countrys cultural and historical tradition and on its
economic fundamentals. In particular, it is possible that a social norm is so pervasive and wide-
spread that it optimally persists in the e¢ cient steady state. This is more likely to be the case
in countries with a signicant gender-wage gap. On the contrary, if a society is relatively closer
to gender equality of opportunity then overcoming the norm might be benecial.
As an example, take Mediterranean (Spain, Italy and Greece) and Nordic countries (Den-
mark, Sweden and Finland). In Mediterranean countries, the gender wage gap is more pro-
nounced ( is low), and we can expect the costs of the social norm to be relatively low. In
Nordic countries, by contrast, the gender wage gap is weak ( is high) and child care structures
are very e¢ cient (which suggests a larger ).19 These stylized observations are conrmed by
the facts that these two types of countries currently show a large disparity in the time that
mothers and fathers devote to informal child care (with the greatest inequality in child care pro-
visions appearing in Spain and the smallest in Denmark), and that the share of career mothers
is currently already much higher in Nordic countries (see, Garcia et al., 2009).20 Finally, Nordic
countries are typically characterized by a larger GDP per-capita. A higher GDP is likely to
translate into larger support for future earning opportunities, implying a relatively higher q and
qM which, in turn, pushes towards a no-norm e¢ cient allocation.
Our model thus suggests that women quotas might be e¤ective in Nordic countries, but be
19This is in line with Garcia et al. (2009, page 7), who argue that ... the cluster of Mediterranean countries
(Spain, Italy and Greece) seems to delegate all the management of child care to the family. These countries are
characterized by a high index of informal care, with formal childcare arrangements being quite underdeveloped.
At the other extreme, is the cluster of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), which follow a
universalist approach, with extensive formal childcare resources. The role of the family in providing care is
substituted almost entirely by the state.See also ONeill (2003) and Blau and Kahn (2016).
20Recall that Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 have shown that larger levels of  and  increase both the laissez
faire share of high-career women and the likelihood of a no-norm rst-best.
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an inappropriate policy in Mediterranean ones. A uniform subsidy on child care, on the other
hand, still represents a second-best policy in Mediterranean countries. Even though it cannot
be expected to achieve a rst-best solution, it is the only policy amongst the three considered
ones that can be welfare-improving when social norms are active.
Throughout the paper we have concentrated on e¢ ciency issues. With quasi-linear pref-
erences and a utilitarian welfare function, redistribution and equity considerations are of no
relevance.21 This is important to keep in mind, because the uniform subsidy we have considered
is clearly regressive; it provides larger benets to high-career couples who also have a higher
income than traditional couples. When the policy is transitory, the regressive e¤ect will be
relevant but only within a single period. However, it will linger when the policy is permanent.
Consequently, one can expect the optimal second-best subsidy to be lower when redistribution is
accounted for, either because individual preferences are concave or because social welfare applies
a concave transformation to individual utilities. The redistributive impact of WQ, on the other
hand, is more complicated to assess. Because redistribution occurs across high-career couples
only, it is certainly not as obviously regressive as the subsidy.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The following table provides the six possible rankings of the threshold values q^n and q^o (which
are given by the solutions to equations (13) and (16) respectively) and the median couple qM .
Since the rankings of q^n and q^o are ambiguous and do not depend on the distribution, while qM
solely depends on the distribution, none of the cases can be ruled out a priori.
We call CNN the constrained no-norm solution, BN the binding norm solution, and UNN
the unconstrained no-norm solution. For each ranking, we indicate below the potential rst-best
solution(s).
(1) qM < q^o < q^n CNN or BN
(2) qM < q^n < q^o CNN or BN
(3) q^o < qM < q^n UNN
(4) q^o < q^n < qM UNN
(5) q^n < qM < q^o CNN
(6) q^n < q^o < qM UNN
In cases from (4) to (6) the (constrained or unconstrained) no-norm rst best always prevails
because, as mentioned in Footnote 12, the constrained binding norm solution is always dominated
by the no-norm solution. In case (3), BN and UNN are both consistentbut UNN yields the
higher level of welfare. To see this formally, one has to derive the social welfare function (11)
with respect to informal child care and apply the envelope theorem. Finally, in cases (1) and (2),
we cannot a priori say which solution prevails, and the relevant rst-best will be the allocation
assuring the highest social welfare between CNN and BN.
We are now in a position to proceed with the comparative statics. Simple inspection of the
above table shows that a binding norm is never optimal if qM > min[q^o; q^n] or in cases (3)(6).
This condition is more likely to be satised the larger qM is and the smaller q^o and q^n are, and
these two benchmarks are decreasing functions of , m, and  (see Equations 13 and 16).
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To complete the proof we must also address cases (1) and (2) arising when qM < min[q^o; q^n]:
In cases (1) and (2), we have either CNN or BN depending on which of these solutions yields
the highest welfare. As mentioned in Section 5, CNN is more likely to prevail the closer qM and
q^o are because, when qM and q^o are close to each other, few couples need to be forced into the
less-preferred career path. As a consequence, a constrained no-norm solution will dominate the
larger qM is and the lower q^o is. As before, a lower q^o is more likely the higher  is and the
higher  is. Finally, CNN is more likely to succeed the lower the social welfare is associated
with BN, and welfare in BN is decreasing in m:
To conclude, taking into account all six possible cases in the previous table, a no-norm
solution is more likely to prevail the larger qM , , m and  are.
A.2 Subsidy on full-time care when the norm is not binding
Alternatively, the social planner could impose a one period subsidy  on full time care only. To
make qM , the marginal couple the subsidy  must satisfy:
qM =
1

[v(ch`) +  [v(1  ch`)  v (1)] + mch`   ] ;
where T is again a uniform lump-sum tax and is given by T = (1 F (qM )) to yield a balanced
budget. Note that, since the subsidy is on full-time care only, ch` is not a¤ected in the transition
period which increases social welfare because, as previously mentioned, ch` is e¢ cient when the
social norm is not binding in rst-best. With a subsidy on full time care welfare amounts to:
SWF = Ehh[q] + E[q] + y + F (q
M )[v(1) + v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)  mch`]:
Because ch` maximizes v(ch`) + v(1  ch`) we have SWF > SWU . Intuitively, the subsidy on
full-time care is a lump-sum payment nanced by a lump-sum tax, while the uniform subsidy
is distortionary and a¤ects the traditional couples level of care. Both policies yield the same
marginal couple, but the uniform subsidy implies a distortion on ch` and is thus welfare inferior.
Note that a subsidy on full-time care also implements the constrained rst-best solution with
a non-binding norm. To ensure that q^ = qM the policy needs to be implemented again on a
permanent basis.
A.3 Parental leave
With PL all couples chose high-career path
Formally, traditional couples opt in PL if it is welfare maximizing, that is, if:
2y + q   T   p(1  cLh`) + v(cLh`) + v(1  cLh`) > y + q   T + v(ch`) + v(1  ch`):
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where the RHS is welfare of type-h` couples when they opt out of PL. The above inequality
reduces to:
ycLh` + v(c
L
h`) + v(1  cLh`) > v(ch`) + v(1  ch`);
which is always true since:
ycLh` + v(c
L
h`) + v(1  cLh`) = maxcm [y   p (1  cm) + v (cm) + v (1  cm)]
> v(ch`) + v(1  ch`) = maxcm [y (1  cm)  p (1  cm) + v (cm) + v (1  cm)] : (A.1)
Proof Lemma 4 (ii)
Let us consider (34) and (10) and notice that, in the equations below, the last two terms are
the same:
~qL =
1
(1  k)

ycLhh + v(c
L
hh) + v(1  cLhh)  v(1) + mch`

(A.2)
q^ =
1

[v(ch`) + v(1  ch`)  v(1) + mch`] : (A.3)
Recalling that cLhh = c
L
h` > c

h` and k 2 (0; 1), and noticing the inequality in (A.1), the RHS
of (A.2) is larger than the RHS of (A.3), which implies that q^ < ~qL. Finally, the inequality
qM < q^ follows by Assumption 1.
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